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INTRODUCTION
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to
succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.1
Litigation challenging the amount of funding available to low-
income school districts is one of several initiatives reformers have pur-
sued to improve the quality of public schools. This particular ap-
proach, so-called education finance litigation, is specifically focused
on reducing the funding disparity that continues to persist among
school districts. 2 The federal government provides approximately
seven percent of funding for public education, 3 making local property
taxes a major source of funds for public schools and resulting in sub-
stantial funding disparities among school districts. Therefore, the
amount of money available for school funding is primarily a function
of the tax rate and the assessed value of the property taxed. Because
no state draws its school districts to equalize the value of the property
base from which it raises taxes, the variation in the amount of money
available for school funding from one district to the next reflects the
substantial disparities in local property values. 4 Furthermore, because
the current school-funding scheme depends on local property values,
it precludes poorer school districts from raising revenues equivalent
to those that wealthier districts raise. Even where poor districts im-
pose high tax rates, low property values prevent them from raising the
same amount of money that wealthy districts are able to raise by im-
posing lower tax rates on higher-valued property. 5
1 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
2 For example, in East St. Louis, Illinois, Martin Luther King Junior High School is
located downwind from one of the nation's largest hazardous-waste-incineration compa-
nies. Students have been forced repeatedly to evacuate after sewage lines back-up and
flood the food-preparation area and gymnasium. In an effort to save costs, the school has
hired seventy "permanent substitute teachers," each earning $10,000 per year. Arguably
worse than the conditions in East St. Louis is the close proximity of this school district to
the affluent public school systems in Fairview Heights. There, students benefit from mod-
em science labs, playgrounds, and libraries. For an in-depth description of the conditions
in the nation's poorest school districts, see JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHIL-
DREN IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1991).
3 See Quentin A. Palfrey, The State Judiciary's Role in Fulfilling Brown 's Promise, 8 MICH.
J. RACE & L. 1, 7 & n.23 (2002) (referencing information from the U.S. Census Bureau
about federal funding for the 1998-99 school year).
4 Basing public school funding largely on local property taxes originated when the
United States had an agricultural economy and rural population. The application of this
property-based finance model to today's urban society creates substantial education-fund-
ing disparities. See Penny L. Howell & Barbara B. Miller, Sources of Funding for Schools, 7 THE
FUTURE OF CHILDREN: FINANCING SCHOOLS, at 39, 41 (Winter 1997); Michael A. Rebell,
Poverty, "Meaning/ul" Educational Opportunity, and the Necessary Role of the Courts, 85 N.C. L.
REv. 1467, 1478 (2007). For an in-depth explanation of the variety of public school fi-
nance systems states may adopt, see Howell & Miller, supra, at 39.
5 Although Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act provides grants
for educational and secondary programs for children of low-income families, the dollar
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Education finance litigators seek to improve the quality of educa-
tion in low-income school districts by increasing the amount of availa-
ble funding. Litigants initially sought to raise the amount of money
available to poor districts by challenging funding disparities between
school districts in federal court. Litigants argued that under the
Equal Protection Clause, per-pupil spending differences between
school districts violated the constitutional right of students in low-in-
come school districts to receive an education equal to that of their
peers in wealthier districts and that the education finance system dis-
criminated against poor persons, thereby creating a suspect classifica-
tion on the basis of wealth. This approach proved unsuccessful in San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,6 and this defeat
prompted litigants to change both the venue in which they filed edu-
cation finance suits-from federal to state court-and subsequently
the strategy pursued-from seeking equitable funding across all
school districts to ensuring that all districts have sufficient funding to
provide their students an adequate education.
In light of these changes, the history of education finance litiga-
tion is traditionally divided into three waves: federal equality litiga-
tion, state equality litigation, and state adequacy litigation. These
various litigation strategies have produced mixed results for securing
increased funding for poor public schools. Current reformers are in
the third wave of education finance litigation, pursuing an adequacy-
based strategy in state courts. This Note argues, however, that given
both the change in focus from equality to adequacy and the political
and legal changes since litigants originally pursued a federal strategy,
education finance litigants should augment their current efforts by
initiating a fourth wave of education finance litigation and pursuing a
federal adequacy litigation strategy. Litigants would base this federal
claim on the U.S. Constitution's Equal Protection Clause and/or the
substantive rights under the Due Process Clause. This approach
would also find support from the federal No Child Left Behind Act,
the Supreme Court's own dicta supporting a potential constitutional
guarantee of a minimally adequate education, and the definition of
an adequate education that has emerged from education finance liti-
gation in state courts.
In Part I of this Note, I discuss advocates' initial pursuit of an
equity-based litigation strategy and the change in venue from federal
amounts are low relative to the overall cost of public education. Title I allocates funds
depending in large part upon the number and concentration of poor children in the
state's school districts and the average per-pupil expenditure in the state. In light of the
focus on existing per-pupil spending, Title I funding "causes the existing pattern of inter-
state inequality in education spending to be reproduced." Goodwin Liu, Interstate Inequality
in Educational Opportunity, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 2044, 2095 (2006).
6 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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to state court. In Part II, I discuss the shift at the state court level from
an equality-based to an adequacy-based litigation strategy and analyze
the advantages of the adequacy movement. Finally, in Part III, I argue
that litigants should pursue a federal adequacy litigation strategy.
Under this new litigation paradigm, advocates for the children of
poor school districts would file a suit in federal court alleging that the
federal government has failed to provide students with a minimally
adequate education. In this Part, I consider how adequacy litigation
in state court and the federal education statute, No Child Left Behind,
have developed judicially manageable standards that enable a federal
court to define an adequate education. I further consider how politi-
cal and legal changes since litigants unsuccessfully filed an equity-
based education finance case in federal court have undermined the
Supreme Court's earlier rationale for refusing to hold that public
school students have a federal right to an education. Finally, I con-
sider possible bases upon which a federal court could find a right to
an adequate education without overruling the Supreme Court's prece-
dent. These bases include: the Supreme Court's own dicta that there
may be federal protection for students' right to receive an adequate
education and the compulsory school attendance laws' implication of
substantive due process requirements. This Note concludes with a
brief discussion of the value of a federal court decision holding that
the Constitution guarantees all students the right to receive an ade-
quate public education. 7
7 For purposes of this Note, I accept that the money school districts gain through
successful school finance litigation will improve the quality of education they provide.
However, there is contentious debate as to whether increasing monetary inputs improves
student achievement. This discussion arose following James S. Coleman's 1966 study on
education equality in the United States. The report, "Equality of Educational Opportu-
nity," referred to today as the "Coleman Report," found that student achievement is not
highly correlated with per-pupil spending alone, but rather is a function of various inputs,
particularly socioeconomic status and student background. See JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL.,
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 302-04
(1966); see also Michael Heise, Educational Adequacy as Legal Theory: Implications from Equal
Educational Opportunity Doctrine 8-10 (Cornell Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Se-
ies, Paper No. 05-028, 2005), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=815665 (summarizing
the debate over the unclear relationship between educational resources and student
achievement). For a study criticizing the belief that "money matters," see ERIC HANUSHEK
ET AL., MAKING SCHOOLS WORK: IMPROVING PERFORMANCE AND CONTROLLING COSTS (1994).
For a discussion supporting the benefits of increased funding, see Ronald F. Ferguson,
Paying for Public Education: New Evidence on How and Why Money Matters, 28 HARV. J. ON
LEGIs. 465, 488 (1991).
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THE HISTORY OF EQUITY-BASED EDUCATION
FINANCE LITIGATION
A. Federal Equality Litigation: San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez
Litigants initiated the first wave of school finance lawsuits in fed-
eral court, grounding their arguments in the Equal Protection Clause
of the U.S. Constitution. The allure of this litigation strategy stemmed
largely from the fact that during the 1950s and 60s, the Supreme
Court interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment such that the Equal
Protection Clause could be used as a powerful weapon to attack public
policy and other well-entrenched areas of the political order.8 The
Clause's promise as an instrument of social change appeared im-
mense, and when advocates applied this newfound constitutional
sword to the area of public education in Brown v. Board of Education
and subsequent desegregation cases, the powerful result illustrated
the latent force of the Equal Protection Clause. 9 Given the Court's
clear acknowledgement in Brown of education's central importance to
both individuals and the nation, advocates for equal educational op-
portunities expected the Court to find in favor of a need to reform
inequitable school funding among districts. 10
The Court decided two other categories of cases that furthered
this expectation: wealth-based discrimination cases and apportion-
ment cases. In one wealth-based discrimination case, the Court re-
quired that states ensure that criminal defendants could utilize the
protections of the criminal justice system, regardless of their financial
resources."l This case and other wealth-based discrimination cases
made it clear that the Equal Protection Clause limited government
policies that, while facially neutral, had the practical effect of denying
opportunities to one class that were available to other classes.1 2 Thus,
both the identification of wealth as an important aspect of equal pro-
tection analysis and the rejection of a requirement that there be facial
discrimination to establish an equal protection violation seemed to
8 See Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance Litigation, and the "Third Wave":
From Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1151, 1153-54 (1995).
9 See Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance Reform, 48
VAND. L. REV. 101, 116 (1995).
10 See Michael A. Rebell, Educational Adequacy, Democracy, and the Courts, in ACHIEVING
HIGH EDUCATIONAL STANDARDS FOR ALL: CONFERENCE SUMMARY 218, 221 (Timothy Ready et
al. eds., 2002), available at http://www.schoolfunding.info/resource center/research/
adequacychapter.pdf.
I1 See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963) (holding that the right to
appeal cannot be blocked by inability to pay for appellate representation).
12 See Enrich, supra note 9, at 117-18.
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lend further support to those advocating for equality in school
funding.13
The second category of cases, legislative apportionment cases, in-
volved state actions that created different opportunities for citizens of
different political subdivisions of the state.14 Under the then-existing
structure, the weight of each vote varied by district. These cases
seemed especially supportive of the argument for equality in educa-
tion funding by illustrating the federal right of all citizens to mathe-
matically equivalent treatment, even when intruding into the state's
traditional control over its own internal political structures. 15
Against this backdrop, parents of students in underfunded school
districts filed suit in federal courthouses, arguing that funding dispari-
ties across school districts violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
When pursuing this equity-based litigation strategy, litigants largely
followed the "district power equalizing" approach developed by John
Coons. Disparities in education finance were due to variations in edu-
cation spending across school districts. However, basing successful lit-
igation upon this geographical discrimination was problematic
because local variation in the provision of public services, like roads
and police officers, is not constitutionally suspect. 16 Coons's strategy
avoided the pitfalls of geographic discrimination by not insisting on a
uniform state education finance system and, in fact, explicitly allowing
for local variation in education spending. Coons's approach focused
on making wealth variation neutral in order to remedy the fact that
even when a poor school district taxed itself at a higher rate than a
wealthy district, the poor district still had less money available per pu-
pil because of its low property values." 7 By drawing upon prior cases
in which the Supreme Court expressed concern for wealth discrimina-
tion in areas of fundamental importance, like the right to vote, Coons
13 See id. at 118. However, Enrich goes on to note that there are significant differ-
ences between the forms of wealth-based discrimination the Court struck down and the
wealth-based inequality in education finance. In cases like Douglas, the wealth-based depri-
vation was a result of the individual's personal financial circumstances, and the deprivation
was an absolute, not relative, deprivation of the opportunity at issue. See id. at 119.
14 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (holding that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause requires "substantially equal state legislative representation for all citizens" in a
state, regardless of where they reside); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962) (holding
that whether a Tennessee reapportionment statute unconstitutionally violated the plain-
tiffs' right to equal protection was ajusticiable question).
15 See Enrich, supra note 9, at 119-20 (noting that in one education funding chal-
lenge, the court characterized the plaintiffs argument as "'[o]ne scholar, one dollar'"
(quoting Spano v. Bd. of Educ., 328 N.Y.S.2d 229, 235 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972))).
16 See Paul A. Minorini & Stephen D. Sugarman, Educational Adequacy and the Courts:
The Promise and Problems of Moving to a New Paradigm, in EQUIrY AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCA-
TION FINANCE: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 175, 179-85 (Helen F. Ladd et al. eds., 1999).
17 SeeJoHN E. COONS ET AL., PPRVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 159, 201-03
(1970).
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hoped that courts would similarly invalidate school funding systems
that permit the quality of education to vary on the basis of wealth. 18
In one of the first cases to apply Coons's district power equalizing
theory, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, parents of
students in the Edgewood Independent School District challenged
the inequities in Texas's public school funding system. 19 Edgewood
was one of seven school districts within the San Antonio area, and its
student body was ninety percent Mexican-American and six percent
African-American. 20 Given the district's low property values, even af-
ter taxing itself at a relatively high rate and receiving supplemental aid
from both the state and federal government, Edgewood could spend
only $356 per pupil. By way of comparison, another San Antonio
school district, the relatively affluent and predominately white Alamo
Heights, could tax itself at a rate twenty percent below the rate in
Edgewood and still have $594 available per pupil. 21 The litigants ar-
gued that variations in education quality, as illustrated by unequal per-
pupil spending across districts, constituted differential treatment that
violated the Equal Protection Clause. 22
The litigants argued both that poverty was a suspect classification
and that education was a constitutionally protected fundamental
right. They based the contention that education was a fundamental
right upon the close relationship, or so-called nexus, between educa-
tion and an individual's ability to meaningfully exercise explicitly pro-
tected constitutional rights, like the right to free speech and the right
to vote. 23 According to traditional equal protection analysis, if the
Court were to hold either that poverty was a suspect classification or
that education was a fundamental right, Texas could sustain its fund-
ing system only by proving a compelling state interest. The district
court held for the plaintiffs, finding that Texas's education finance
system discriminated on the basis of wealth and that the State failed
"'even to establish a reasonable basis"' for creating suspect classifica-
tions and infringing upon a fundamental right.2 4
However, in a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court reversed
and held that neither the plaintiffs' poverty nor the importance of
education justified applying strict scrutiny when reviewing Texas's ed-
18 See Minorini & Sugarman, supra note 16, at 181.
19 See 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
20 See Rebell, supra note 10, at 221-25.
21 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 11-14 (noting that the average assessed property value per
pupil in Edgewood was $5,960 whereas the average assessed property value per pupil in
Alamo Heights exceeded $49,000).
22 See id. at 16; Heise, supra note 8, at 1155-56.
23 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35.
24 See id. at 16 (quoting Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280,
284 (W.D. Tex. 1971)).
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ucation finance system. Writing for the majority, Justice Powell first
stated that poverty was not a suspect class. He questioned whether
poor persons "necessarily clustered in the poorest property districts" 25
and described poor persons as too "amorphous" and "diverse" a group
to justify being treated under strict scrutiny.26 Justice Powell also dis-
tinguished Rodriguez from prior Supreme Court precedent condemn-
ing wealth-based discrimination because those prior cases involved
absolute deprivations; by contrast, in Rodriguez, Texas merely afforded
less funding to the plaintiffs than to others. 27
Justice Powell then found that education is not a fundamental
right by emphasizing that the Constitution neither implicitly nor ex-
plicitly guaranteed it.28 While acknowledging the importance of edu-
cation both to individuals and to society, Justice Powell stated that the
"importance of a service performed by the State does not determine
whether it must be regarded as fundamental. '" 29 The majority likewise
rejected the litigants' nexus theory. Although the majority acknowl-
edged the validity of the argument that education was essential to the
effective exercise of the right to free speech and the right to vote-
two rights that the Court had "long afforded zealous protection"-
Justice Powell went on to say that the Court has "never presumed to
possess either the ability or the authority to guarantee to the citizenry
the most effective speech or the most informed electoral choice. 30
Though "desirable goals" in their own right, such values should not
"be implemented by judicial intrusion into otherwise legitimate state
activities."31
Having rejected both of the plaintiffs' arguments for applying
strict scrutiny, the Court applied a rational basis test and found that
the Texas funding scheme was rationally related to the legitimate gov-
ernment interest of assuring a "large measure of participation in and
control of each district's schools at the local level."3 2 Although the
Court acknowledged that the Texas system's reliance on local prop-
25 Id. at 23; see Rebell, supra note 10, at 222.
26 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28.
27 See id. at 20-23 (describing prior cases in which the Court struck down state laws
that denied indigent criminal defendants the right to a transcript or the right to court-
appointed counsel and in which a substantial filing fee for primary elections was invali-
dated). The Court distinguished the facts in Rodriguez from its prior holdings by stating:
"The individuals, or groups of individuals, who constituted the class discriminated against
in our prior cases shared two distinguishing characteristics: because of their impecunity
they were completely unable to pay for some desired benefit, and as a consequence, they
sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to enjoy that benefit." Id. at
20.
28 See id. at 33-35.
29 Id. at 30.
30 Id. at 36-38.
31 Id. at 36.
32 Id. at 47-49.
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erty-tax revenues resulted in "some inequality" across districts, the
Court said that this was "not alone a sufficient basis for striking down
the entire system." 33 Thus, Rodriguez has come to stand for the pro-
position that education is not a fundamental right.
However, even in light of the holding in Rodriguez, there remains
a viable argument that there is a constitutionally protected federal
right to a certain minimum level of education. The plaintiffs in Rodri-
guez focused heavily upon per-pupil funding disparities between rich
and poor districts and argued that these differences violated the Equal
Protection Clause. However, the plaintiffs did not argue that the qual-
ity of education in Edgewood fell below a constitutionally protected
minimum floor and that Texas had therefore failed to provide an ade-
quate education. 34 In fact, the Court itself acknowledged this possibil-
ity by noting in dicta that the Constitution might guarantee "some
identifiable quantum of education" to ensure the meaningful oppor-
tunity to exercise other fundamental rights, like free speech.3 5 The
Court continued by saying:
Whatever merit appellees' argument might have if a State's financ-
ing system occasioned an absolute denial of educational opportuni-
ties to any of its children, that argument provides no basis for
finding an interference with fundamental rights where only relative
differences in spending levels are involved and where-as is true in
the present case-no charge fairly could be made that the system
fails to provide each child with an opportunity to acquire the basic
minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech
and of full participation in the political process.36
The issue of whether education constituted a fundamental right
arose again at the federal level in Plyler v. Doe,37 where the Court con-
sidered the constitutionality of a Texas statute that withheld state
funds from school districts that used funding to educate children who
illegally entered the United States and permitted school districts to
refuse to enroll these children. In another five-to-four decision, the
Court found that the Texas statute was unconstitutional. However, in
so holding, the Court refrained from classifying education as a funda-
mental right.38 Rather, the Plyler Court held that Texas could not es-
tablish "some substantial state interest" for completely denying
children who illegally entered the country from receiving an educa-
33 Id. at 50-51 (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961)).
34 See Justin J. Sayfie, Comment, Education Emancipation for Inner City Students: A New
Legal Paradigm for Achieving Equality of Educational Opportunity, 48 U. MiAMi L. RFv. 913,
921-22 (1994).
35 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36.
36 Id. at 37.
37 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
38 See id. at 223-24.
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tion.39 By so holding, the Court did not decide whether the fact that
the Texas statute allowed total denial of public education to illegal
immigrants required analysis under a strict scrutiny test, a test which,
if applied, would have suggested that education is a fundamental
right. While the Plyler Court did not recognize education as a funda-
mental right, the Court distinguished education from other "govern-
mental 'benefit[s]"' and discussed the importance of education and
its ability to empower disadvantaged groups. 40 Furthermore, in keep-
ing with the Rodriguez dicta and the Plyler decision, the Court in
Papasan v. Allain explicitly recognized that it remains open whether a
minimally adequate education is a fundamental right.4 1
B. The Aftermath of Rodriguez: Equity-Based Education Finance
Cases in State Courts
Despite the possibility that a constitutionally protected minimum
level of education might exist, Rodriguez seemed to foreclose the possi-
bility of federal courts requiring states to provide public school stu-
dents with equal funding. Thus, in the wake of Rodriguez, advocates
for equal funding redirected their litigation strategy to focus on state
courts. Litigants in the earliest state court suits continued to make an
equality-based argument, now grounded in the equal protection
clauses of various state constitutions4 2 in combination with state con-
stitutions' education clauses, which require the states to provide edu-
cational services. 4 3 During this so-called second wave of education
39 See id. at 230; Daniel S. Greenspahn, A Constitutional Right to Learn: The Uncertain
Allure of Making a Federal Case out of Education, 59 S.C. L. REV. 755, 769 (2008) (stating that
the Plyler Court applied a heightened form of scrutiny that it developed further in later
years).
40 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221-22.
41 See 478 U.S. 265, 285 (1986) ("As Rodriguez and Plylerindicate, this Court has not yet
definitively settled the questions whether a minimally adequate education is a fundamental
right and whether a statute alleged to discriminatorily infringe that right should be ac-
corded heightened equal protection review.").
42 See Enrich, supra note 9, at 105 ("[M]ost state constitutions contain one or more
provisions that either parallel the federal Equal Protection Clause or have been inter-
preted to impose substantially the same limitations.").
43 See id. at 105-06. Education clauses impose a duty on states to provide a form of
public education. Gershon Ratner describes these education clauses as falling into four
basic groups. See Gershon M. Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban Public Schools: Effective
Education in Basic Skills, 63 TEX. L. REv. 777, 815 & nn.143-46 (1985). First are education
clauses containing only general education language, like the provision of the Connecticut
Constitution that guarantees "free public elementary and secondary schools in the state."
CONN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1. Second are education clauses that specify the quality of public
education that the state will provide. For example, the New Jersey Constitution provides
for a "thorough and efficient system of free public schools." N.J. CONsT. art. VIII, § 4.
Third are those education clauses that contain a more specific mandate, like the Rhode
Island Constitution's requirement that the legislature "adopt all means which it may deem
necessary and proper to secure.., the advantages... of education." R1. CONST. art. XII,
§ 1. Finally, the fourth category consists of those education clauses that provide for the
[Vol. 95:989
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finance litigation, plaintiffs continued to make similar arguments to
those the litigants in Rodriguez made-mainly that education consti-
tutes a fundamental right or, alternatively, that school-district poverty
constitutes a suspect classification entitling students to substantial edu-
cational equality.44
Initially, this litigation strategy produced some successful results.
Prior to Rodriguez, the California Supreme Court found the state's ed-
ucation finance system unconstitutional in Serrano v. Priest.45 The
court emphasized the indispensible role of education in a modern
society and compared the importance of education to the importance
of two widely recognized fundamental rights-the rights of defend-
ants in criminal cases and the right to vote.46 In this pre-Rodriguez
decision, the court held that education is a fundamental right and
that the school finance system implicated a suspect classification on
the basis of wealth. 47 As a result, the court evaluated the system under
a test of strict scrutiny.48 Acknowledging that the state education fi-
nance system furthered legitimate government interests such as local
control over schools, the court nevertheless found the system uncon-
stitutional. The court held that rather than promoting local control,
the rampant interdistrict funding disparity deprived poor districts of
financial control. Unlike more populous and affluent districts, poor
districts did not have the choice to create high-quality public schools
by imposing a high tax rate because a poor district's overall property-
tax revenue was insufficient to support educational excellence at any
reasonable tax rate. 49
In response, the California legislature addressed the court's call
for equal treatment and sought to produce convergence between rich
and poor districts by modifying the existing funding approach. Spe-
cifically, the legislature increased the minimum funding levels and
strongest commitment to public education. For example, the Washington Constitution
states, "It is the paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for the education of
all children residing within its borders." WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
44 See Palfrey, supra note 3, at 16-17. Where the plaintiffs relied either in full or in
part upon the state constitution's education clause, they argued that the education clause
itself demanded that the state provide substantially equal educational opportunities for
poor and wealthy school districts. SeeJohn C. Eastman, Reinterpreting the Education Clauses
in State Constitutions, in SCHOOL MONEY TRIALs: THE LEGAL PuRsurr OF EDUCATIONAL ADE-
QUACY 55, 55-56 (Martin R. West & Paul E. Peterson eds., 2007) (criticizing state courts
that find a new fundamental right to an adequate education based on the education
clauses in state constitutions).
45 See Serrano v. Priest (Serrano 1), 487 P.2d 1241, 1255-59 (Cal. 1971).
46 See id.; see also Jonathan Banks, Note, State Constitutional Analyses of Public School Fi-
nance Reform Cases: Myth or Methodology?, 45 VAND. L. REv. 129, 143-44 (1992) (noting the
court's emphasis on the "indispensible role of education in a modem industrial society").
47 See Serrano I, 487 P.2d at 1250, 1258.
48 See id. at 1258.
49 See id. at 1259-60; Heise, supra note 8, at 1155.
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limited the maximum per-pupil expenditure by capping the tax rate a
school district could levy without a voter override. 50 The constitution-
ality of this new funding system reached the California Supreme Court
again in 1976, following the Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez.51
Notwithstanding the federal precedent, the court reaffirmed that edu-
cation in California is a fundamental right, a liberty at the core of a
democratic government, and that the education finance system in-
volved a suspect classification on the basis of district wealth. 52 Apply-
ing the same analysis from its earlier Serrano I decision, the court
found that despite the legislative improvements, educational opportu-
nity under the new finance system still depended largely on local taxa-
ble wealth. 53 Accordingly, the court held that the revised education
finance system violated the California Constitution's equal protection
provisions.54
While this California decision suggested that the pursuit of a state
court, equality-based litigation strategy held promise, the initial suc-
cess was short lived. The court orders that resulted from such cases
directed state legislatures generally to eliminate the inequities in the
funding system, but provided little specific guidance about how the
legislatures should achieve this goal. Some legislatures adopted dis-
trict power equalizing plans that guaranteed each local district a spe-
cific amount of revenue for a given local tax rate. 55 Under these
plans, states redistributed the extra revenue that school districts with
high property values generated to districts with low property values.56
50 See Serrano v. Priest (Serrano 11), 557 P.2d 929, 935-37 (Cal. 1976) (summarizing
the legislation the California legislature passed in light of Serrano I, Senate Bill No. 90 and
Assembly Bill No. 1267).
51 See id. at 929.
52 See id. at 952; Banks, supra note 46, at 143.
53 See Serrano II, 557 P.2d at 953, 968-69 ("The system in question .. .suffer[s] from
the same basic shortcomings as that system which was alleged to exist in the original com-
plaint-to wit, it allows the availability of educational opportunity to vary as a function of
the assessed valuation per [average daily attendance] of taxable property within a given
district.").
54 See id. at 957-58.
55 See Rebell, supra note 10, at 226.
56 See id. The Texas legislature implemented this type of redistributive plan after the
Texas Supreme Court struck down its earlier efforts to implement less drastic reform. See
Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood I), 804 S.W.2d 491, 496 (Tex. 1991); Car-
rollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. (Edgewood I11), 826
S.W.2d 489, 514 (Tex. 1992). Referred to as the "Robin Hood" plan, the financing scheme
capped each school district's taxable property at $280,000 per student. The plan permit-
ted any revenues collected in excess of the cap to be redistributed to poorer districts. See
Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno (Edgewood IV), 917 S.W.2d 717, 728 (Tex. 1995). The
constitutionality of the Robin Hood system was upheld after it was challenged on the basis
of the Texas Constitution's requirement that the state provide "an efficient system" of pub-
lic schools. See id. at 725 (internal quotations omitted). However, such success was short
lived. In Neeley v. West Orange-Cove Consolidated Independent School District, the Texas Su-
preme Court found that the education finance system was an unconstitutional ad valorem
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Unsurprisingly, wealthy districts staunchly opposed such funding
schemes. Furthermore, strategies aimed at reducing disparities in ed-
ucational expenditures proved similarly unsuccessful. 57 Thus, the re-
sistance to judicial attempts to enforce fiscal equity and the difficulty
of actually achieving equal educational opportunity dissuaded other
state courts from issuing similar holdings.58 By the early 1980s, plain-
tiffs had won only two education finance cases. By 1988, fifteen state
supreme courts had denied any relief, while only seven had found for
the plaintiff.59 Professor Peter Enrich summarized the shortcomings
of equality-based litigation theories by stating:
In short, equalization of outcomes, or even of actual services, has
proven too ambitious a standard in the political process. And yet,
mere equalization of tax capacity, or even the significant progress
some states have achieved toward equalization of school budgets,
has proven insufficient to put the educational opportunities of dis-
tax. See 176 S.W.3d 746, 797-98 (Tex. 2005). The history of education finance litigation in
Texas illustrates many of the difficulties state legislatures face when creating a plan that is
both constitutional and politically tenable. For a summary of Texas's education finance
litigation history since Rodriguez, see Angela Marie Shimek, Comment, The Road Not Taken:
The Next Step for Texas Education Finance, 9 SCHOLAR 531, 538-44 (2007).
57 See Rebell, supra note 10, at 226-27. In California, the trial judge in Serrano II held
that interdistrict funding disparities must be reduced to insignificant amounts, defined as
"considerably less than $100.00 dollars per pupil." Serrano H, 557 P.2d at 940 n.21. How-
ever, California voters followed this judicial mandate with Proposition 13, a popular initia-
tive that amended the state constitution to cap increases in local property taxes. The effect
of the equalization mandate and property cap was a leveling down of California's educa-
tion expenditures. During the 1964-65 school year, California ranked fifth in the nation
in per-pupil spending, but by the 1994-95 school year, the state had dropped to forty-
second. See Rebell, supra note 10, at 227.
58 See Rebell, supra note 10, at 227. In Lujan v. Colorado State Board of Education, the
Colorado Supreme Court determined that neither low-income people nor low-income
school districts qualified as a suspect class. See Banks, supra note 46, at 134-35. The court
rejected the possibility of low-income school districts constituting a suspect class by finding
that because its terms embodied only personal rights, the state equal protection clause
applied only to individuals. SeeLujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1020 (Col.
1982) (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948)). The court further found that low-
income people were insufficiently distinct and insular to satisfy the requirements of equal
protection analysis. Poor persons lacked common attributes or characteristics, and the
plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the group was centered in low-wealth property districts.
The court viewed poor persons as an amorphous group that historically has not been sub-
ject to purposefully unequal treatment. See id. at 1020-22. Even equality arguments
grounded in both the equal protection and education clauses of the state constitution
failed. In Olsen v. State, the Oregon Supreme Court upheld the state's school finance sys-
tem. See 554 P.2d 139, 149 (Or. 1976). The Oregon Constitution guaranteed a "uniform,
and general" system of schools. OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 3. There, rather than deciding
whether the state's education clause elevated education to the status of a fundamental
right, the court used a balancing test, weighing the impact on the interest in educational
opportunity against the state's justification for its financing system. See Olsen, 554 P.2d at
145. Reviewing substantial evidence about the deficient educational opportunities in poor
districts, the court found that the state's interest in local control justified these disparities.
See id. at 145-49.
59 See Rebell, supra note 10, at 227.
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advantaged children on a par with those of their better-off peers.
The result has been increasing disenchantment with the goal of pro-
viding equal educational opportunity through equally supported
public schools .... 60
II
THE TRANSITION FROM EQUITY TO ADEQUACY: THE THIRD
WAVE OF EDUCATION FINANCE LITIGATION
A. A Newfound Focus on Adequacy
Faced with state courts becoming markedly less receptive to
equality-based arguments, advocates again redirected their litigation
strategy. In this third wave of education finance litigation, litigants
moved away from the traditional focus on per-pupil spending dispari-
ties and, instead, towards the overall sufficiency of funds that states
allocated to public schools. In doing so, litigants concentrated almost
exclusively on education clauses of state constitutions, rather than on
equal protection clauses or a combination of the two.6 1 State courts
have been receptive to these new adequacy-based arguments; ade-
quacy plaintiffs have prevailed in twenty-five states and have been vic-
torious in ten of the fourteen cases decided between 2003 and 2005.62
This shift from equity to adequacy was largely the result of the
standards-based reform movement of the 1980s. During this period,
numerous national studies compared America's education system with
that of other industrialized nations. 63 The findings were staggering,
calling into question the quality of schools not only in impoverished
60 See Enrich, supra note 9, at 154-55.
61 See id. at 165-66; see alsoJames E. Ryan, A Constitutional Right to Preschool?, 94 CAL. L.
REv. 49, 69-84 (2006) (arguing for a constitutional right to preschool based on state con-
stitutions' education clauses as supported by education finance adequacy litigation).
62 See Martin R. West & Paul E. Peterson, The Adequacy Lawsuit: A Critical Appraisa in
SCHOOL MONEY TRIALS: THE LEGAL PURSUIT OF EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY, supra note 44, at 1,
2-6 (graphing the number of states in which a court rendered a final judgment in an
education finance case on equity or adequacy grounds and comparing the outcomes in
equity versus adequacy cases); see also MICHAEL A. REBELL & JESSICA R. WOLFF, CAMPAIGN
FOR EDUc. EQUITY, LITIGATION AND EDUCATION REFORM: THE HISTORY AND THE PROMISE OF
THE EDUCATION ADEQUACY MOVEMENT 8 (2006), available at http://www.schoolfunding.
info/resourcecenter/adequacy-history.pdf (noting that adequacy plaintiffs have prevailed
in twenty-one of twenty-eight major education funding decisions by states' highest courts).
But see Richard Briffault, Adding Adequacy to Equity, in SCHOOL MONEY TRIALS: THE LEGAL
PURSUIT OF EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY, supra note 44, at 25, 26-27 (discussing the overlap
between equity and adequacy and the difficulty of classifying a case as exclusively adequacy
or equity based).
63 See REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 62, at 4. Arguably the most conspicuous study was
the National Commission on Excellence in Education's 1983 report entitled A Nation at
Risk. See Melissa C. Carr & Susan H. Fuhrman, The Politics of School Finance in the 1990s, in
EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 16, at
136, 147. The findings from these various studies led President George H. W. Bush to
commission a National Education Summit in 1989 to put forth national education goals
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districts, but in all public schools-wealthy and poor alike-and warn-
ing that the poor quality of American education was undermining the
country's ability to compete in the international economy. In re-
sponse to these reports, many states enacted extensive reforms impos-
ing more rigorous academic requirements. 64 These standards-based
reforms built upon substantive standards in English, math, history,
and other major subject areas to set standards at the level necessary
for students to compete in the global economy.65 The reform move-
ments thereby gave substantive content to plaintiffs' adequacy-based
litigation strategy.66
The influence of the standards-based reform movement is illus-
trated in Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc.,6 7 arguably the most
successful adequacy-based litigation. In Rose, the Kentucky Supreme
Court noted that "Kentucky ranked fortieth nationally in per-pupil
spending and thirty-seventh in average teacher salary."' 68 Although
the plaintiffs brought the case on behalf of poor school districts that
sought more equitable funding for their students, the court went fur-
ther and found that even Kentucky's more affluent school districts
were inadequately funded when compared against acceptable na-
tional standards.69 The court declared that Kentucky's entire system
of public schooling was inadequate and unconstitutional, directing
the Kentucky General Assembly to "re-create, and re-establish a system
of common schools. 70
Rose was important both for its holding and for its definition of an
adequate education, which has proved especially influential. The
Kentucky Supreme Court held that an adequate education was one
that had the goal of developing the following seven basic capacities in
each child:
(i) sufficient oral and written communication skills to enable stu-
dents to function in a complex and rapidly changing
civilization;
(ii) sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and political systems
to enable the student to make informed choices;
and establish education standards. Every state governor and CEOs of many major corpora-
tions attended the summit. See REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 62, at 4.
64 See Rebell, supra note 10, at 229.
65 See id.
66 SeeJames E. Ryan, Standards, Testing, and School Finance Litigation, 86 TEX. L. REv.
1223, 1227-39 (2008) (discussing the relationship between the creation of academic stan-
dards and school finance litigation and criticizing litigants' reliance on testing and failure
to adopt a comparative perspective).
67 See 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
68 Heise, supra note 8, at 1163.
69 See id.
70 See Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 214.
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(iii) sufficient understanding of governmental processes to enable
the student to understand the issues that affect his or her
community, state, and nation;
(iv) sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her mental
and physical wellness;
(v) sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each student to ap-
preciate his or her cultural and historical heritage;
(vi) sufficient training or preparation for advanced training in ei-
ther academic or vocational fields so as to enable each child to
choose and pursue life work intelligently; and
(vii) sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to enable pub-
lic school students to compete favorably with their counter-
parts in surrounding states, in academics or in the job
market. 71
The court's detailed definition of the skills necessary for participation
in a democratic society and the modem economy provided an outline
of the goals for standards-based education cases but left further devel-
opment and implementation of the system to the legislative and exec-
utive branches of government. 7 2 Subsequently, two state supreme
courts adopted this definition of an adequate education, 73 and nu-
merous other courts have explicitly relied upon it when defining a
constitutionally adequate education. 74
B. Advantages of an Adequacy-Based Litigation Strategy
As the recent proliferation of pro-plaintiff holdings suggests, ade-
quacy-based arguments present numerous advantages over equality-
based arguments for improving educational opportunity. Three of
these advantages, discussed in greater detail below, are that: (1) ade-
71 Id. at 212. This detailed definition of an adequate education was the result of sub-
stantial dialogue between the Kentucky Supreme Court, the public, and the standards-
based education reform movement. In crafting it, the Kentucky Supreme Court heard
extensive expert testimony and read an extensive post-trial brief filed by a citizens' educa-
tion advocacy group. In fact, after issuing his liability decision, the trial judge withheld his
remedy decision for six months. During that time, a special committee held five hearings
across the state and enumerated five outcomes that it perceived as an adequate education.
The trial court largely adopted the committee's findings, with the Kentucky Supreme
Court including the key findings in its final decision. See Rebell, supra note 10, at 235.
72 See Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 215-16 (further holding that the legislature must monitor
the state education system to prevent waste or mismanagement); Rebell, supra note 10, at
235.
73 See McDuffy v. Sec'y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 554 (Mass.
1993); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997).
74 See, e.g., Unified Sch. Dist. No. 229 v. State, 885 P.2d 1170, 1186 (Kan. 1994) (not-
ing the striking resemblance between Rose's definition of an adequate education and the
standards that the Kansas legislature subsequently adopted); Claremont, 703 A.2d at
1359-60 (rejecting an adequacy definition promulgated by the state education department
and advising that the department look to the seven specific criteria from Rose as guidance);
Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (N.C. 1997) (citing Rose and defining a "sound basic
education" in terms of four basic skills that schools must develop in students).
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quacy is normatively more appealing and consistent with widely held
societal values; (2) adequacy allows for continued local control of pub-
lic education; and (3) adequacy directly focuses on the quality of edu-
cation the state provides.
First, given that it is financially prohibitive to bring all school dis-
tricts' education spending up to the level of the highest spending dis-
trict in the state, equality suggests a zero-sum game, demanding that
wealthier school districts surrender their resources and accomplish-
ments to the relatively worse-off districts. 75 This is a contentious and,
for some, a normatively unappealing objective. Adequacy arguments
instead focus on the appalling conditions in the poorest school dis-
tricts so as to raise the quality of education at the bottom levels. By
refraining from adopting a comparative posture, adequacy advocates
can invoke a broader vision in which both the quality of education in
poor districts improves and society as a whole experiences significant
social and economic gains. 76 In contrast to equity's emphasis on re-
distribution and leveling between districts, adequacy's focus on educa-
tion as a universal good to which all children are entitled more closely
aligns with traditional values of fairness and opportunity, thus tending
to be more widely accepted by courts and society. 77
Second, because adequacy conflicts less with local control of pub-
lic education, adequacy challenges are less threatening to the status
quo of public education. 78 By seeking to ensure a reasonable level of
resources across all school districts, adequacy does not prohibit a state
from continuing to rely on local property taxes as a major source of
local school funding. 79 Entitling all students to receive an adequate
education still allows wealthy school districts to tax themselves at a
higher rate to provide a more-than-adequate education for their own
students. Thus, adequacy preserves the political goal that local re-
sources should benefit local students.80
Third, a focus on adequacy allows both the courts and state legis-
latures to adopt a more holistic approach to improving the quality of
education. The equity-based strategy relied on per-pupil expenditure
75 See Frederick M. Hess, Adequacy Judgments and School Reform, in SCHOOL MONEY TRi-
ALS: THE LEGAL PURSUIT OF EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY, supra note 44, at 159, 160. For an
example of how this precise concern played out in California, see supra note 57.
76 See Enrich, supra note 9, at 168-69 (acknowledging that although the reality of
achieving adequacy may in fact be a redistribution of resources, the focus on betterment
rather than competition among the districts nevertheless makes affluent districts more tol-
erant of adequacy arguments).
77 See id. at 167.
78 See id. at 169-70.
79 See id. at 170.
80 See id.; Michael Heise, Litigated Learning and the Limits of Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2417,
2440 (2004).
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as a proxy for the quality of education.8 1 Equity's limited focus on
fiscal equality was especially unfavorable for urban school districts be-
cause it failed to account for the fact that some districts faced higher
costs than others and that some districts had larger numbers of stu-
dents with special needs. 82 These shortcomings made advocates for
poor students in inner cities question whether equity, even if success-
ful, would be capable of generating meaningful educational reform.
In contrast, adequacy encourages development of "a framework that
addresses the myriad components of a quality education rather than
confining it to the narrower and less promising task of equalizing a
finite set of inputs."8 3
III
THE FOURTH WAVE OF EDUCATION FINANCE LITIGATION: AN
ARGUMENT FOR THE PURSUIT OF A FEDERAL
ADEQUACY LITIGATION STRATEGY
Because of the success of adequacy litigation at the state level and
the advantages of challenging the adequacy of education rather than
the relative equality of education finance, plaintiffs continue today to
use an adequacy-based litigation theory in battling to improve the
quality of public education. In light of the previously discussed his-
tory of the three waves of education finance litigation, this Note ar-
gues that litigants should augment these efforts by pursuing an
adequacy-based litigation strategy at the federal level as well. Various
changes since the 1973 Rodriguez decision strengthen the viability of a
claim that the federal government has failed to meet its duty to pro-
vide students with an adequate education. Significant political and
legal developments since 1973 have undermined many of the Rodri-
guez Court's reasons for refusing to find a positive federal right to edu-
cation. The changes have also resulted in judicially manageable
standards and Supreme Court decisions analyzing education quality,
both of which further justify pursuit of a federal adequacy litigation
strategy.
A. The Viability of a Federal Adequacy Litigation Strategy
A viable litigation strategy must assure courts that: (i) there are
judicially manageable standards by which courts believe they can ef-
fect change in the area, and (ii) a decision in the litigant's favor would
81 See Palfrey, supra note 3, at 13; Ryan, supra note 61, at 75 ("[T]he underlying rights
in [adequacy cases] need not be defined solely in terms of money.... [F]unding remedies
do not exhaust the scope of the underlying rights at stake in school finance cases.").
82 See Minorini & Sugarman, supra note 16, at 183-84.
83 See Palfrey, supra note 3, at 13.
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be consistent with previous judicial decisions. 84 In light of the devel-
opments in education litigation since Rodriguez, a federal adequacy-
based litigation strategy fulfills both of these criteria. The availability
ofjudicially manageable standards and continuity with precedent nec-
essarily strengthen the litigation strategy's claim that the quality of ed-
ucation in poor and underfunded school districts falls below federal
minimum guarantees.
1. Judicially Manageable Standards
A likely factor underlying the Court's decision in Rodriguez was
the Justices' concern that there was a lack of judicially manageable
standards in the area of educational quality. However, this concern
appears far less trenchant considering the proliferation of state court
decisions finding and defining a positive right to an adequate educa-
tion and the passage of the federal No Child Left Behind Act
(NCLB) .85 State court litigation and federal legislation have provided
precisely the judicially manageable standards that the Rodriguez Court
sought.
Four years prior to Rodriguez, the Supreme Court reviewed a fiscal
equality suit involving disadvantaged urban students.8 6 At trial, the
plaintiffs argued that the state's education finance system was inade-
quate to meet their educational needs and that there existed a federal
constitutional right to a school funding system that "apportions public
funds according to the educational needs of the students."87 Focusing
on the difficulty of measuring student need, the lower court dismissed
the case on nonjusticiability grounds. There were, in the district
court's view, no discoverable and manageable judicial standards by
which to determine whether such a system violated students' constitu-
tional rights. 88 The district court noted that even the remedies that
the plaintiffs proposed would not satisfy their claim that education
funding should directly relate to student need.89 The Supreme Court
affirmed without opinion,90 with the lack of judicially manageable
84 See COONS ET AL., supra note 17, at 317.
85 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-7941 (2006).
86 See Rebell, supra note 10, at 224.
87 See McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 330-31 (N.D. Il. 1968) (involving a state
funding system that provided each student with a minimum foundation financing level of
$400); Rebell, supra note 10, at 228.
88 See Mclnnis, 293 F. Supp. at 335-36.
89 See id. at 331-36. The plaintiffs offered two possible solutions: first, that all students
across the state receive the same dollar appropriation; or second, that the state eliminate
all variations in local property values but continue to allow districts to set their own tax
rates. See id at 331-32; Rebell, supra note 10, at 224-25.
90 McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969).
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standards likely influential not only in that action but also in the
Court's decision in Rodriguez.91
In fact, the Rodriguez Court itself expressed concern about the
effect of finding a constitutionally protected right to education, a
right that would have invalidated the Texas education finance
scheme. 92 Justice Powell, writing for the majority, described such a
decision as being an "unprecedented upheaval in public education"
and noted that "there is nothing simple or certain about predicting
the consequences of massive change in the financing and control of
public education." 93 Justice Powell also expressed specific concern for
the lack of judicially manageable standards by stating, "l[E] qually un-
settled [is the] controversy as to the proper goals of a system of public
education."9 4
Having allowed school finance litigation to percolate at the state
court level, much of the Rodriguez majority's expressed concern is no
longer valid. A consensus definition of an adequate education has
emerged from the proliferation of state court litigation. 95 This con-
sensus defines an adequate education as one that prepares students to
participate meaningfully in modern-day life. 96 As discussed above, the
Kentucky Supreme Court's definition of an adequate education as
one that develops students' skills in seven basic areas has proven espe-
cially influential. 97 Rebell and Wolff divide the consensus definition
of an adequate education that has emerged from state court decisions
into three parts: (1) the constitutional standard for an adequate edu-
cation; (2) the types of knowledge and skills an adequate education
must provide students; and (3) the essential resources students need
to acquire the knowledge and skills an adequate education provides. 98
The first part requires that education empower students to function
effectively in a democratic society and to compete effectively in the
economy. The second specifies the types of knowledge and skills that
students need to be effective citizens in a rapidly changing society.
91 See Rebell, supra note 10, at 225.
92 See id. at 221-24.
93 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 56 (1973).
94 See id. at 43; see also Betsy Levin, The Courts, Congress, and Educational Adequacy: The
Equal Protection Predicament, 39 MD. L. REv. 187, 190 (1979) ("The Supreme Court's reluc-
tance to find that education is a fundamental fight entitled to special protection was at
least in part due to the Court's fear that there are no judicially manageable standards for
determining what amount of education is constitutionally guaranteed.").
95 See REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 62, at 10-11.
96 See id. at 10. As Michael Rebell and Jessica Wolff explain, "[t]here is widespread
agreement that an adequate system of education is one that 'will equip students for their
roles as citizens and enable them to succeed economically and personally."' Id. at 11
(quoting Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388, 396 (Wis. 2000)).
97 See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
98 See REBELL & WoLFF, supra note 62, at 11 (giving the full consensus definition of an
adequate education).
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These skills include: the ability to read, write, and speak English;
knowledge of basic math, science, geography, history, and the politi-
cal system; intellectual tools to evaluate complex issues and communi-
cate ideas; and vocational skills to compete in further schooling or to
gain employment. The third standard describes the essential re-
sources students need in order to attain the above-listed knowledge
and skills. These include: qualified teachers and principals; appropri-
ate class sizes and school facilities; early childhood services; supple-
mental programs for students with disabilities, students from high-
poverty backgrounds, or students learning English; and educational
resources like textbooks, libraries and computers. 99 Furthermore, by
setting specific educational goals and measuring student achievement,
the standards-based reform movement produces data on whether
schools are successfully providing students with an adequate educa-
tion. 100 These substantial education statistics create a much different
landscape than the one faced by the Rodriguez Court, when federally
funded education research was just beginning. 10 1
In addition to adequacy litigation, No Child Left Behind has simi-
larly provided contours to the definition of an adequate education. 10 2
Signed into law in January 2002, the legislation had a stated purpose
to ensure that "all children have a fair, equal, and significant opportu-
nity to obtain a high-quality education" by "closing the achievement
gap between . . . disadvantaged children and their more advantaged
peers." 10 3 Although the legislation does not specifically define an ade-
quate education, NCLB requires states to develop one. 10 4 States must
set specific, rigorous education standards in various subjects and an-
nually test their students' performance to determine whether they are
proficient under the applicable state standard. 10 5 NCLB conditions
99 See id. at 11 n.49 (quoting seven state courts' definitions of an adequate education).
100 See id. at 14 (describing state adequacy cases as the best current example of Justice
Brandeis's formulation of federalism in which states serve as "'laboratories"' for innovation
in public policy).
101 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973) (stating that
the alternatives to Texas's funding scheme were "only recently conceived and nowhere yet
tested").
102 See David J. Hoff, Federal Law Bolsters Case for Aid Suits: Experts Warn States of Greater
Exposure, EDuc. WEEK, Oct. 1, 2003, at 1.
103 See 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2006).
104 SeeJames S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, The Federal No Child Left Behind Act and the
Post-Desegregation Civil Rights Agenda, 81 N.C. L. REv. 1703, 1706 (2003) (noting that be-
cause NCLB contains no enforcement mechanisms, courts will be forced to generate judi-
cially manageable standards, the absence of which had previously prevented courts from
desegregating public schools).
105 See Kimberly A. Murakami, Annotation, Construction and Application of No Child Left
Behind Act, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (Codified at 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 6301 et
seq.), 4 A.L.R. FED. 2D 103 (2005). On March 13, 2010, Present Barack Obama announced
that he would send an "education blueprint" to Congress. This education-reform proposal
seeks to change and strengthen many aspects of NCLB-such as rewarding the academic
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each state's receipt of federal Title I education funding upon its crea-
tion of a statewide accountability system and assessment of its "Ade-
quate Yearly Progress." 10 6 NCLB further requires that all students be
proficient by 2014.107 Additionally, NCLB requires states to ensure
that all teachers are "highly qualified" and to allocate a certain per-
centage of Tide I funding to specific school-improvement activities.108
Like the standards-based reform movement, the required Adequate
Yearly Progress reports will provide litigants with data and statistics
illustrating the current status of public education and will further pro-
vide courts with a means by which to assess whether public schools are
providing an adequate education. 10 9
2. Continuity with Earlier Decisions
In addition to the development of judicially manageable stan-
dards through state adequacy litigation and NCLB, one can also look
to Supreme Court precedent in which the Court has analyzed whether
the quality of education satisfied a guaranteed minimum standard. In
both early civil rights education litigation and in later cases, the Court
has supported students' receipt of a meaningful educational opportu-
nity and shown a willingness to consider and articulate the features
that contribute to an adequate education. These prior cases illustrate
that when evaluating a particular educational experience, the Court
has tended to reject those factors that were central to an equity-based
argument, such as per-pupil expenditure. Instead, the Court has
given weight to those criteria that an adequacy-based theory tends to
growth of students rather than continuing the current Act's pass-fail system-while retain-
ing some aspects of the federal law, such as required annual reading and math tests. One
of the proposed changes includes evaluating schools' success in narrowing the achieve-
ment gap between affluent and poor students. See Sam Dillon, Obama Proposes Sweeping
Change in Education Law: Readiness for College; Continued Testing, but Less Interference for Well-
Run Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2010, at Al.
106 See Michael Salerno, Note, Reading is Fundamental: Why the No Child Left Behind Act
Necessitates Recognition of a Fundamental Right to Education, 5 CARDozo Pun. L. POL'Y & ETH-
icsJ. 509, 536-37 (2007) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 6319(b) (3) (C)).
107 See Rebell, supra note 4, at 1489.
108 See Salerno, supra note 106, at 536-37 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 6319(a)).
109 See Hoff, supra note 102. Present Obama's proposal for revising NCLB would re-
quire states to create rating systems for teachers and principals based largely on their stu-
dents' performance. Currently, many school districts do not have the capacity to do so, but
if such studies were required, these ratings would provide additional data upon which a
court could evaluate the adequacy of the education a school district provides to its stu-
dents. See Editorial, Mr. Obama and No Child Left Behind, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2010, at A24.
This discussion of No Child Left Behind is, of course, not a suggestion that the con-
gressional statute define the substance of the constitutional right to an adequate educa-
tion. C.f City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1997) (holding that Congress
cannot define by statute the content of a constitutional right). Nonetheless, federal courts
in search ofjudicially manageable standards can refer to No Child Left Behind in deciding
the contours of the right.
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emphasize, considering the overall learning experience and the
amount of knowledge students receive.110 During the civil rights
movement, the Court evaluated whether students were receiving a
meaningful educational opportunity by considering both tangible and
intangible factors. Prior to Brown v. Board of Education,111 the Court
illustrated in Sweatt v. Painter1 12 that a meaningful education could
not be defined solely by tangible factors, such as the student-faculty
ratio or the number of books in the library. In Sweatt, the Court
found that a newly opened, black-only law school failed Plessy's "sepa-
rate but equal" doctrine because it did not provide African-American
law students with a legal education that was equivalent to the educa-
tion their white counterparts received at the University of Texas Law
School. The Court stated that the University of Texas Law School's
superiority resulted in part from intangible factors such as the "repu-
tation of the faculty, experience of the administration, position and
influence of the alumni, standing in the community, traditions and
prestige."'113 The Court's broad consideration of a meaningful educa-
tional experience continued when it struck down Plessy's "separate but
equal" doctrine in Brown I. There, the Court considered social-
science data showing that separating students solely according to race
"generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the commu-
nity."114 In focusing on the stigmatic harm that black school children
experienced, the Court again adopted a more holistic definition of a
meaningful educational experience that was not limited to tangible
features alone.1 15
In Lau v. Nichols,1 16 the Court again considered whether a state
was providing students with a meaningful educational opportunity.
1 17
Lau addressed whether the Civil Rights Act of 1964 required Califor-
nia to provide additional educational services to Chinese students who
did not speak English. In finding that California violated the Act by
failing to provide English-language instruction, the Court held that
"there is no equality of treatment merely by providing students with
the same facilities, textbooks, teachers, and curriculum; for students
110 See Sayfie, supra note 34, at 933 (describing the Court's past decisions as focusing
on educational ends-such as the amount of knowledge the student obtained, rather than
upon education means, such as the amount of money spent or the types of programs im-
plemented-and characterizing this as an "educational-attainment context").
111 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown 1).
112 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
113 Id. at 633-34.
114 Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494.
115 See Rebell, supra note 4, at 1493-94.
116 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
117 See Rebell, supra note 4, at 1496.
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who do not understand English are effectively foreclosed from any
meaningful education."'118
The Court again considered the parameters of a meaningful edu-
cational opportunity in the Rodriguez case itself.119 Even though the
plaintiffs were contesting the constitutionality of the funding disparity
between wealthy and poor school districts, the Court did not measure
education quality by per-pupil expenditure. Rather, the Court de-
fined the value of education in terms of its ability to empower students
to participate effectively in a democratic society. 120 As in Lau, the
Court in Rodriguez focused on the amount of knowledge students were
able to attain, rather than measuring education in terms of relative
resources.
The Court's consistent adoption of an output-based evaluation of
educational opportunity in Sweatt, Brown, Lau, and Rodriguez supports
this Note's argument that litigants should now pursue a federal
adequacy-based litigation strategy. Adequacy, like those precedents,
analyzes education in terms of the overall quality of education pro-
vided to students rather than on relative disparities in per-pupil ex-
penditures. Thus, the emergence of a consensus definition of an
adequate education combined with earlier cases where the Court ana-
lyzed students' educational experiences in holistic terms support the
claim that litigants should bring a challenge in federal court. In such
a challenge, litigants should allege that the education provided to stu-
dents in poor and underfunded school districts fails to provide the
students their constitutionally protected opportunity to acquire a min-
imally adequate education.
B. Changes Undermining Major Aspects of the Rodriguez
Majority's Opinion
In addition to these developments, significant political and legal
changes have occurred that undermine Rodriguez. These changes fur-
ther justify the adoption of a new litigation paradigm in which advo-
cates pursue a federal adequacy-based litigation strategy. This Note
argues below that litigants who challenge the adequacy of education
in federal court should adopt legal theories that would not require
the Court to overrule Rodriguez. Nevertheless, the significant political
and legal changes since Rodriguez illustrate that current circumstances
are considerably more conducive to federal judicial involvement in
education.
Preserving federalism and maintaining state control over educa-
tion was one of the Court's primary concerns in Rodriguez. The Court
118 Lau, 414 U.S. at 566.
119 See Sayfie, supra note 34, at 933.
120 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30-31, 35-36 (1973).
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described the merits of local control by stating that "' [1] ocal control is
not only vital to continued public support of the schools, but it is of
overriding importance from an educational standpoint.' 121 While
historically education has been regarded as an area best relegated to
the states, the post-Rodriguez passage of federal legislation involving
the federal government in public education illustrates that local con-
trol over public schools is diminishing. Legislation such as the No
Child Left Behind Act and the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act (IDEA) 122 directly involve the federal government in education by
imposing specific requirements on states and local schools. 123 Under
NCLB, federal funding for education is conditioned upon states' de-
velopment of rigorous education standards and annual testing of their
students to determine whether local schools have met the state-cre-
ated requirements. 124 Likewise, the IDEA entitles students with disa-
bilities to receive a "free appropriate public education" and requires
school districts to develop an "individualized education program"
(IEP) for each child with a disability.125 This IEP ensures that the
child receives educational instruction "specially designed" to meet his
"unique needs."1 26 When announcing NCLB, President George W.
Bush stated, "Change will not come by disdaining or dismantling the
Federal role of education.... [E]ducational excellence for all is a
121 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 49 (quoting Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 478
(1972) (Burger, CJ., dissenting)). The Court also expressed the magnitude of the federal-
ism principles the case put at stake: "While '[t]he maintenance of the principles of federal-
ism is a foremost consideration in interpreting any of the pertinent constitutional
provisions under which this Court examines state action,' it would be difficult to imagine a
case having a greater potential impact on our federal system than the one now before us,
in which we are urged to abrogate systems of financing public education presently in exis-
tence in virtually every State." Id. at 44 (quoting Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S.
522, 532 (1959) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
122 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (2006).
123 See Salerno, supra note 106, at 538-39. Although technically any state is free to
ignore NCLB if it is willing to forgo federal education funding, this possibility is not a
reality because public schools are fiscally dependent upon federal assistance. See id. at 538.
President Obama's education initiative "Race to the Top" further increases federal involve-
ment in education. For states that undertake drastic school improvement initiatives, the
program rewards those who apply and whose proposal is rated most highly with federal
grants totaling nearly four billion dollars. During the first round of competition, Delaware
was awarded $100 million of federal grant money and Tennessee was awarded about $500
million. Secretary of Education Arne Duncan plans to divide the remaining $3.4 billion
among the second-round winners. President Obama has requested an additional $1.3 bil-
lion to extend the competition for 2011. See Sam Dillon, Delaware and Tennessee Win U.S.
School Grants, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2010, at A15.
124 See supra notes 104-09 and accompanying text.
125 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (1), (4).
126 Id. § 1401(9), (14), (29); see also Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, What Constitutes Ser-
vices that Must Be Provided by Federally Assisted Schools Under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA) (20 US.CA. §§ 1400 et seq.), 161 A.L.R. FED. 1 (2000).
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national issue."'127 As President Bush's statement suggests, the wide-
spread, bipartisan backing of these two pieces of legislation signals
broad political support for a federal role in education.
Intertwined with its concerns about preserving federalism, the
Rodriguez Court also expressed its belief that involvement in education
was not something to which federal courts were suited. 128 The Court
noted that matters of "educational policy" and matters of "fiscal pol-
icy" are both areas "in which th [e] Court's lack of specialized knowl-
edge and experience counsels against premature interference with
the informed judgments made at the state and local levels."1 29 The
passage of federal education legislation, however, has likely under-
mined this rationale. For example, the IDEA directly expands the fed-
eral judiciary's involvement in education by giving an aggrieved party
the right to seek review in federal court of a state educational agency's
determination as to whether a disabled child's education satisfies the
IDEA's guarantee of a "free appropriate public education." 130 In
2007, the Court interpreted its judicial review power under the IDEA
to include suits brought by parents in their own right, not derivative
from their child. In Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City School
District, the Court held that parents had an individual right to sue
under the IDEA concerning their child's receipt of the IDEA's entitle-
ment to a "free appropriate public education."1 3 1
In addition to expressing a desire to preserve local control over
education, the Rodriguez Court also articulated a slippery-slope argu-
ment. The Court questioned how education was distinguishable from
other "significant personal interests" like basic "food and shelter"13 2
and, therefore, how a finding that education is a fundamental right
could be necessarily and logically limited so as not to warrant constitu-
tional protection for other basic necessities. The Court likely based its
concern in part on the fact that at the time of Rodriguez, the Depart-
ment for Housing, Education, and Welfare was responsible for over-
seeing education.1 3 3 That the federal government grouped education
with these other government benefits at the agency level supported
the Court's concern that the judicial branch could not meaningfully
distinguish education from other important social interests. However,
127 Remarks on Submitting the Education Reform Plan to the Congress, 1 PUB. PAPERS
11, 12 (Jan. 23, 2001); see Salerno, supra note 106, at 539.
128 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 58 (1973) (describing
the "wisdom of the traditional limitations on this Court's function").
129 Id. at 42.
130 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a), (i) (1)-(2); Rebell, supra note 4, at 1534.
131 See 550 U.S. 516, 527-28 (2007) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a)).
132 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37.
133 See Greenspahn, supra note 39, at 771 (noting that some commentators have distin-
guished education from other benefits because it is the only government benefit for which
attendance is compelled).
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a basis for distinguishing education occurred in 1979 with the "crea-
tion of an independent cabinet-level Department of Education."134
Indeed, several years later in Plyler v. Doe, the Court itself character-
ized education as not "merely some governmental 'benefit' indistin-
guishable from other forms of social welfare legislation." 135
In sum, many political and legal changes have occurred since the
Court decided Rodriguez more than thirty years ago. These changes
indicate that local control over education is diminishing, that judicial
involvement in education is permissible, and that education is firmly
established as distinct from other government benefits. In the current
landscape, federal judicial involvement to improve the quality of edu-
cation in the nation's poorest schools is now widely desired.
C. Basis for a Federal Right to an Adequate Education
The pursuit of a federal adequacy-based litigation strategy has
drawn strength from political and legal changes that have spurred ju-
dicially manageable standards, developed Supreme Court precedent
evaluating education quality, and addressed major concerns of the
Rodriguez majority. Successful adequacy litigation in state court, how-
ever, has been grounded in the education clauses of state constitu-
tions. The federal Constitution does not provide a similarly explicit
guarantee of free public education. Nevertheless, the South Carolina
Supreme Court's decision in Abbeville County School District v. State136
and the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Jackson v. Indiana137 both
support the claim that students have a federally protected right to re-
ceive an adequate education. Scholars have put forth numerous addi-
tional bases upon which the Court could justify finding a positive right
to education. 138 However, in light of the success and advantages that
adequacy litigation has enjoyed at the state level, two theories best
allow litigants and courts to draw strong parallels to adequacy litiga-
tion in state court and thereby incorporate the advantages of an
134 Id.
135 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982).
136 515 S.E.2d 535 (S.C. 1999).
137 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
138 See generally Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Education Under
the U.S. Constitution: A Beginning to the End of the National Education Crisis, 86 Nw. U. L. REV.
550, 553 (1992) (analyzing a right to education under substantive due process, the First
Amendment, the right to vote, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and providing
principles of constitutional construction that further support a positive right to education
derived from international agreements, the Ninth Amendment, international human
rights law, and historical evidence of original intent); Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and
National Citizenship, 116 YALE L.J. 330, 334 (2006) (arguing that the Citizenship Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment requires Congress to ensure a meaningful floor of educa-
tional opportunity).
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adequacy-based theory. The Court is more likely to accept these theo-
ries because neither directly contradicts the Rodriguez holding.
Under the first theory, litigants could base the positive right to an
adequate education upon the Rodriguez Court's own suggestion that
there may exist a federally protected "identifiable quantum" of educa-
tion.1 39 As discussed in Part I, the Rodriguez majority did not abso-
lutely reject the possibility that there exists a federally protected right
to education. Rather, the Court never reached the issue of whether
the plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment rights would have been vio-
lated if the quality of public education in Texas fell below a hypotheti-
cal floor because the State repeatedly claimed in its brief that Texas
"4assures 'every child in every school district an adequate education'
and the plaintiffs offered no proof at trial "persuasively discrediting or
refuting the State's assertion. '140 As a result of this pleading defi-
ciency, the Court could only hint that the Constitution might implic-
itly guarantee students "some identifiable quantum" of education.
141
The constitutional basis for this dictum was a partial embrace of the
litigants' nexus argument that education is a protected right because
it facilitates the exercise of explicitly protected constitutional rights
like free speech and voting.1 42 The Rodriguez majority hypothesized
that the Constitution might protect some minimum amount of educa-
tion because students must have at least some education "to acquire
the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of
speech and of full participation in the political process."1 4
3
The Rodriguez Court's reference to this "identifiable quantum" is
best understood as a "high minimum" that comports with the consen-
sus definition of an adequate education that developed in state ade-
quacy litigation and NCLB. 144 The South Carolina Supreme Court's
decision in Abbeville County School District v. State145 supports this analy-
sis. The case exemplifies the tendency of state high courts to define
the constitutionally guaranteed standard of education as of a high-
minimum sort even where the applicable state constitution does not
explicitly provide such an educational guarantee. Although the edu-
cation clauses of some state constitutions specifically describe the
139 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36 (1973). The possibil-
ity of a constitutionally protected minimum floor of education has been preserved in sub-
sequent federal education litigation. See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
140 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 24; Ratner, supra note 43, at 831 & n.233 (concluding that
in light of the state's pleadings, when the Court used the phrase " ' absolute deprivation of
education,' it implicitly defined education as adequate education" (footnote omitted)).
141 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36.
142 See id. at 36-37.
143 See id. at 37.
144 See Briffault, supra note 62, at 38 (noting that in school finance litigation, adequacy
has developed as a theory of "equity plus").
145 515 S.E.2d 535 (S.C. 1999).
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quality of guaranteed education-such as the New Jersey Constitu-
tion, which promises a "thorough and efficient"146 education-the
South Carolina Constitution contains no such promise.1 47 Instead, its
education clause provides only for the "maintenance and support of a
system of free public schools."' 148
The trial court found that given this constitutional language, the
only viable claim under the education clause of the state constitution
was that there was no system of free public schools open to all children
in the state.149 Despite the minimal language in the state constitution,
the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed for the plaintiffs and in-
terpreted this provision as "requir[ing] the General Assembly to pro-
vide the opportunity for each child to receive a minimally adequate
education. ' 150 The court then defined a minimally adequate educa-
tion in accordance with the consensus definition of an adequate edu-
cation. The court described the level of education guaranteed to
students as one that provides the opportunity to acquire "(1) the abil-
ity to read, write, and speak the English language, and knowledge of
mathematics and physical science; (2) a fundamental knowledge of
economic, social, and political systems, and of history and governmen-
tal processes; and (3) academic and vocational skills."1 51 As with the
Court's dictum in Rodriguez, the bare language of the South Carolina
Constitution required that the state provide only a minimum educa-
tion. Despite the lack of qualitative standards, the South Carolina Su-
preme Court adopted a high-minimum definition of education that is
largely consistent with the consensus definition of an adequate educa-
tion. Therefore, the Abbeville decision supports the position that the
federal government has a duty to provide an adequate education even
though Rodriguez suggested only that some minimum amount of edu-
cation is federally protected. While such state decisions are not bind-
ing precedent on federal courts, the Supreme Court can look to the
prevailing policy in the states for guidance.1 52
146 N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4.
147 See supra note 43 and accompanying text (describing the four categories of educa-
tion clauses in state constitutions).
148 S.C. CONsT. art. XI, § 3.
149 See Abbeville, 515 S.E.2d at 539.
150 See id. at 540.
151 See id. (citing the seven-factor definition of an adequate education the Kentucky
Supreme Court articulated in Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky.
1989)).
152 See Salerno, supra note 106, at 510-11 & n.14 ("[T]he objective indicia of national
consensus here-the rejection of the juvenile death penalty in the majority of States... -
provide sufficient evidence that today our society views juveniles . . .as 'categorically less
culpable than the average criminal.'" (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 567
(2005))).
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Alternatively, litigants could argue for a positive right to an ade-
quate education on the substantive due process requirements that
compulsory school-attendance laws trigger. Developed by Gershon
Ratner, this theory analogizes compulsory education to the criminal
context and concludes that the required level of schooling must pro-
vide students with an adequate education. 153 Compulsory school-at-
tendance laws deprive students of various liberties, including the
freedom to travel and freedom from confinement. Ratner argues that
this implicates the substantive due process requirement that any dep-
rivation be reasonably related to a legitimate government interest. 154
In Jackson v. Indiana, the Supreme Court considered the substantive
due process rights of a criminal defendant who had been involuntarily
committed to a state mental institution. The Court held that the na-
ture of the confinement must "bear some reasonable relation to the
purpose for which the individual is committed. 1 55 In other words,
when a defendant is committed for treatment, the state mental institu-
tion must provide treatment. 156 Although the facts of Jackson con-
cerned compulsory confinement in a state mental institution,
compulsory school-attendance laws similarly require children of a cer-
tain age to attend public school. Therefore, by extending the Court's
constitutional analysis beyond its facts, Jackson supports a viable argu-
ment that there exists a federal right to an adequate education.
In the context of education, the purpose of compulsory attend-
ance is to educate students. Applying Jackson, compulsory education
must be reasonably related to the purpose that it serves. 157 In other
words, just as confinement for treatment requires the mental institu-
tion to treat its patients, confinement for education requires the
school to educate its students. Because it is not rational for schools to
provide an ineffective education, Ratner concludes that "compulsory
education is not reasonably related to its purposes unless schools pro-
vide adequate education in basic skills." 158
Both theories would allow the Court to find a federal positive
right to an adequate education without overruling Rodriguez. These
litigation strategies are preferable to equity litigation strategies be-
cause they draw specific parallels to cases in which courts have found
153 See Ratner, supra note 43, at 823-28.
154 See id.
155 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
156 See Ramer, supra note 43, at 826 (noting that while the Supreme Court itself has not
explicitly addressed whether Jackson requires a state mental institution to provide treat-
ment where a criminal defendant has been committed for the purpose of treatment, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit so held in Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d
1305, 1312 (5th Cir. 1974)).
157 See id. at 828.
158 See id.
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that an aggrieved party has the right to an adequate benefit. There-
fore, the strategies allow litigants to argue not only that the Court
should find a positive right to education but also that the guaranteed
standard of education is an adequate one, as defined in state court
adequacy decisions and No Child Left Behind.
CONCLUSION
In light of both federal and state court decisions holding that dis-
parities in school funding do not violate the federal Equal Protection
Clause, advocates' dedication and willingness to develop a new ade-
quacy-based litigation strategy to improve the quality of public educa-
tion for the nation's underprivileged children was "remarkable."159
Given the continued success of adequacy litigation in state court, it is
now time for advocates to build upon these successes by redirecting
education litigation to focus on the development and pursuit of a fed-
eral adequacy-based strategy. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once
wrote, "The Fourteenth Amendment is not a pedagogical require-
ment of the impracticable." 160 In the first wave of education litiga-
tion-in which litigants asked the Supreme Court to find that the
Constitution required equal funding among school districts-the liti-
gants were arguably asking the Court to do the "impracticable." How-
ever, in light of the development of an adequacy-based theory at the
state court level and the advantages of adequacy over equity, a litiga-
tion strategy that asks the Court to recognize students' right only to
receive a minimally adequate education cannot be characterized as
similarly "impracticable." During the quarter-century since Rodriguez,
the development of judicially manageable standards, the accumula-
tion of Court precedent applying an output-based analysis of educa-
tion quality, and the legal and political changes undermining much of
the Rodriguez majority's reasoning all support the pursuit of a new liti-
gation paradigm-a federal adequacy-based strategy-that will initiate
the fourth and final wave of education finance litigation.
Even though state high courts continue to issue decisions in favor
of education reform, this federal strategy must be pursued because it
offers unique advantages that make it better suited to improve the
national education crisis. 161 The advancement of equal educational
opportunity would not have occurred without the Supreme Court's
159 See Rebell, supra note 10, at 228 ("In light of the U.S. Supreme Court's rejection of
plaintiffs' claims in Rodriguez and the difficulties experienced by the state courts that issued
remedial decrees in the early years, it is remarkable that advocates and state court judges
continued to seek new ways to ensure fair funding and meaningful educational opportuni-
ties for poor and minority students.").
160 Dominion Hotel, Inc. v. Arizona, 249 U.S. 265, 268 (1919).
161 Even in light of these advantages, there are substantial limitations on the Court's
power. If the Court were to recognize a positive right to a minimally adequate education,
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decision in Brown.162 If the Court were to affirm students' right to an
adequate education, the decision would be a similar "agent of moral
suasion," focusing national attention on improving the quality of edu-
cation for students in poor and underfunded districts. 163 Further-
more, if the Court were to recognize a federal right to a minimally
adequate education, the federal government would then bring its
"uniquely national perspective, powers, and resources to bear upon
what has become, in scope and consequence, a truly national prob-
lem."'164 State-by-state litigation is too slow and piecemeal to resolve
the current crisis in education effectively. 165 Therefore, the Court
should use its "power and legitimacy to demand that the political
branches actually live up to their constitutional obligations to minori-
ties when majoritarian institutions fail over time."'1 66 The federaljudi-
ciary's inaction is contributing to the gradual erosion of the
expectation that "[s]tudents, even from the most difficult back-
grounds, can academically and socially succeed." a67 The federal
courts cannot continue to damage one of the nation's most funda-
mental social values. A federal adequacy-based litigation strategy must
therefore be pursued so that the Court can fulfill its responsibility of
"declaring and insisting on the vindication of constitutional rights."'168
realizing such a holding would require much work on the part of the political branches
and education experts. See generally Heise, supra note 80.
162 See Rebell, supra note 4, at 1540.
163 See Bitensky, supra note 138, at 552-53.
164 See id.
165 See CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR TH4E ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, AN IMPERILED GENERA-
TION: SAVING URBAN SCHOOLS Xiv-XV (1988) (stating the need for a "unified response" to
the urban school crisis); Banks, supra note 46, at 153-55 (describing the lack of predictabil-
ity in state court responses to education litigation because of each state's unique constitu-
tional provision and various equal protection analyses).
166 Palfrey, supra note 3, at 40.
167 CARNEGIE FOUND., supra note 165, at xv.
168 Rebell, supra note 4, at 1540.
1020 [Vol. 95:989
